Income convergence across countries turns on whether technological knowledge spillovers are global or local. I estimate the amount of spillovers from R&D expenditures on a geographic basis, using a new data set which encompasses most of the world's innovative activity between 1970 and 1995.
Income convergence in a large class of models turns on whether the scope of technological knowledge spillovers is global or local. Global spillovers favor convergence at the level of cities and regions, as well as at the level of countries, whereas spillovers that are geographically limited in scope can lead to economic clusters with persistently different levels of output per capita. Whether or not the industrialized countries will remain the rich permanently, and what are the prospects for less developed countries to catch up, are both questions whose answers hinge on the scope of knowledge spillovers.
It is widely held that technological knowledge is truly global because increasing economic integration through trade as well as new means of telecommunications and the internet ensure that people in all countries have access to the same pool of knowledge. Even differences in the technology that is actually employed (as documented in James Harrigan 1997, e.g.) are consistent with a global pool of technology if the rate of complementary human and physical capital investments or the incentive to adopt new technology varies across countries. 1 Alternatively, technological knowledge may be to some extent local. Helsinki, for instance, is located about 1,500 kilometers away from Bonn, around 6,900 kilometers from Washington, D.C., and 7,800 kilometers from Tokyo, while the distance from Canberra to Bonn, Washington, and Tokyo is 16,500, 16,000, and 8,000 kilometers, respectively. If knowledge spillovers are local, then productivity in Finland should, ceteris paribus, be higher than in Australia, because the former is closer than the latter to Germany, the U.S., and Japan, the three countries that account for more than 75 percent of the world's spending on research and development (R&D).
I will investigate whether knowledge spillovers are global or local by examining whether the distance between countries affects the magnitude of productivity gains from each others' R&D spending.
Geographic distance should not matter for international technology diffusion if there is a global pool of technological knowledge or a country's technology level depends only on idiosyncratic non-spatial factors. If knowledge spillovers are partly local, however, then in addition to the implications for convergence, the following questions should be considered.
First, the scope of spillovers determines the long-run effectiveness of macroeconomic policies that aim at raising a country's rate of technical change. Only when international technology diffusion is limited will one country's R&D subsidies have a higher effect on domestic growth than everywhere else in the world. By contrast, when there are perfect spillovers, a change in the rate of technical change at the national level will have no impact on a country's position in the long-run world ranking.
Moreover, if spillovers are global, the public good nature of such policies would raise the question of how to insure that national policies will be at the efficient level, given the incentive of all to free-ride on the efforts of other countries.
Second, technology differences affect the comparative advantage and trade of countries (e.g., Daniel
Trefler 1995). If technology diffusion is influenced by geographic factors, then production functions and comparative advantage will also vary systematically according to location, thereby influencing international trade of countries. This work on the geographic scope of technology diffusion will thus provide important information for future work on dynamic models of trade and comparative advantage such as proposed by Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman (1991) .
My approach follows a substantial amount of work showing that the link between R&D expenditures in one industry and productivity in another is best viewed as a process of technology diffusion (F. Michael Scherer 1984, Zvi Griliches 1995). The theoretical framework underlying my estimatespresented in Appendix A-illustrates this mechanism between countries. I relate R&D spending in France, Germany, Japan, the U.K. and the U.S. (which I will refer to as the G-5 countries) to the productivity levels in nine other OECD countries. The first question I examine is whether the magnitude of the productivity effects from G-5 country R&D depends on the bilateral geographic distance between technology sender and recipient country. Second, using data on language skills, I analyze the extent to which technology diffusion results from the direct transmission of information between economic agents. Third, I ask whether the localization effects, if they exist, have become stronger or weaker over time.
Recent theoretical work showing that global spillovers favor convergence while localization allows for divergence includes Robert Feenstra (1996) and Grossman and Helpman (1991, Ch.8 (1993) and Jaffe and Manuel Trajtenberg (1998) . These authors have compared the location of patent citations with that of the cited patents, showing that U.S. patents are significantly more often cited by other U.S. patents than by foreign patents. The papers isolate the flow of technological knowledge by focusing on patent citations, but they do not assess the economic impact of technology diffusion in terms of output or productivity. 2 Also Jonathan Eaton and Samuel Kortum (1999 Kortum ( , 1996 use data on patenting to estimate country-level models of technology diffusion and productivity growth. Their diffusion parameter estimates confirm that technology diffusion is geographically localized in the sense that there is more within-than between-country diffusion. However, what identifies the diffusion parameters is that there is more patenting within-than across countries. By contrast, my estimates on geography effects in technology diffusion are based directly on the distance between countries, not indirectly through a mechanism such as patenting which is known to be correlated with distance.
Other authors have studied productivity effects from both domestic and foreign R&D in a production function framework, typically estimating that the effect from domestic R&D is stronger than that from foreign R&D (David Coe and Helpman 1995, Wolfgang Keller 2001) . This is consistent 2 See also Laura Bottazzi and Giovanni Peri (1999) , who examine patenting in European regions.
with the geographic localization of technology diffusion. However, the main focus in these papers is to evaluate the importance of a particular mechanism-international trade-as a conduit of technology diffusion. Here, I take a broader empirical approach. Rather than testing a particular model, I focus on whether knowledge spillovers are global or local. Moreover, by exploiting cross-sectional variation in the relative distance of countries to their partner countries rather than distinguishing only between domestic and foreign R&D, my estimates are the first on international technology diffusion that are based on a relatively rich geographic structure. 3 More generally, other recent work including Antonio Ciccone and Robert Hall (1996) and Gordon Hanson (1998) has pointed to important geographic localization effects. The former find that productivity is positively correlated with the density of economic activity in the United States, while the latter obtains an estimate of the geographic scope of backward and forward trade linkages by estimating a spatial labor demand function for the United States. Neither paper is concerned with the geographic scope of knowledge spillovers. By contrast, I will analyze knowledge spillovers on a geographic basis by exploiting the variation of productivity effects from foreign R&D as the relative location of technology sender and recipient countries varies.
In the next section, I provide an overview of the empirical setting. Based on a model of trade, transportation costs, and growth which is described in Appendix A, section 2 presents the estimation equation and discusses major estimation issues. All estimation results can be found in section 3. The final section 4 contains a summary and further discussion of the results. The appendix also contains a short description of the sources and the construction of the data; a more detailed account can be 3 The papers by Jeffrey Bernstein (1998) and Bernstein and Pierre Mohnen (1998) show that productivity effects from U.S. R&D in Canada are stronger than in Japan, which is consistent with the localization hypothesis. See also the related analysis with firm-level data on U.S.-Japan spillovers by Lee Branstetter (2001) , as well as the paper by Ishaq Nadiri and Seongjun Kim (1996) . James Adams and Jaffe (1996) study geographic effects for domestic technology diffusion, estimating the effects of knowledge spillover among plants of the same firm in the U.S. chemicals industry between 1974-88. They find that the productivity-enhancing effects of parent firm R&D are significantly smaller for plants that are relatively far away than for plants that are relatively nearby.
Empirical setting
This section takes an extended look at the data that I will employ. Although much is already known about these countries and industries, the context provided in this overview emphasizes important new aspects of how productivity, distance, and R&D expenditures in the sample vary. Moreover, R&D expenditures by these countries constitute at least 90 percent of the world's total innovative activity and almost all business R&D in the manufacturing sector for these years. 4 The countries are Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, West Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The analysis encompasses almost all of manufacturing, subdivided into twelve industries at the two-to three-digit ISIC level. 5 These are food, beverages and tobacco (ISIC 31), textiles, apparel, and leather (ISIC 32), wood products and furniture (ISIC 33), paper and printing (ISIC 34), chemicals and drugs (ISIC 351+352), rubber and plastics (ISIC 355+356), non-metallic mineral products (ISIC 36), basic metals 4 I use data on total business enterprises R&D, irrespective of funding. A focus on privately-funded R&D would be preferable, because the return to publicly funded R&D is lower than that for private R&D projects (e.g. Lichtenberg 1993) , and the degree of public funding is not uniform across industries and countries. However, data on the subset of R&D expenditures that is privately-funded is not available to a sufficient degree for this sample. 5 Two industries have been dropped from the sample: ISIC 353+354, Petroleum and Refineries, because of relatively bad data, and ISIC 39, Other Manufacturing, because it includes rather different products across countries.
(ISIC 37), metal products (ISIC 381), non-electrical machinery and instruments (ISIC 382+385), electrical machinery (ISIC 383), and transportation equipment (ISIC 384). Table 1 provides summary statistics. While the size of the countries varies substantially in terms of GDP, it does so even more in terms of R&D expenditures. The G-5 countries (France, Germany, Japan, the U.K. and the U.S.) conduct 92.6 percent of the total R&D in the sample, while their share of manufacturing GDP is only 74.95 percent. Recognizing their dominant position, I will treat the G-5 countries as the only sources of foreign technology. Moreover, because the effects from foreign R&D might be very different in the G-5 and the non-G-5 countries, I will focus on the productivity effects of G-5 R&D in the other nine countries.
Also, the cross-industry variation is higher for R&D than for GDP. Most of the R&D is done in chemicals, machinery, electronics, and transportation, accounting for a total of 83 percent of all R&D.
An increase in R&D activity in these four industries amounts to a major change in national technological trends, which, through inter-industry spillovers, might stimulate R&D and raise productivity in other industries as well. Thus, the possibility of a simultaneous determination of productivity and R&D is heightened in the case of these four industries (see section 2 for more on simultaneity).
The unit of observation in the data is the enterprise, so that its entire activity is allocated to the enterprise's major industry. In the presence of multi-product firms, this is undesirable. Using several auxiliary sources, I estimate that a strong bias by industry or by country is unlikely. I therefore assume that the influence of this on the empirical results below is limited. R&D expenditures are transformed to stocks with the perpetual inventory method. Table 1 shows that the average annual growth rates of R&D stocks vary substantially by country.
The relative location of the countries
The distance data in this paper is kilometers between the capital cities of the countries, as the crow flies (from Jon Haveman 1998). Broadly speaking, three types of countries can be distinguished:
(1) European countries, which are relatively close to the U.K., France, and Germany, about 6,000 kilometers away from the U.S., and around 9,000 kilometers away from Japan; (2) Canada, which is close to the U.S., about 5,500 kilometers away from the European G-5 countries, and about 10,000 kilometers away from Japan; and Australia, which is around 16,500 kilometers away from all G-5 countries except for Japan, which is about 8,000 kilometers away. It is defined as
where c = 1, ..., C; i = 1, ..., I; t = 1, ..., T ; c indexes country, i indexes industry, and t is the subscript for time. The variable Z is value added, L is labor inputs, and K denotes capital inputs. Further,
The variableσ cit is an average of labor cost shares,σ cit = also varied considerably over time, so that country fixed effects cannot control for them. Because the adjusted data are preferred for the purpose of comparing productivity across countries, I will primarily rely on that. However, to examine the robustness of the findings, results based on the unadjusted data will also be presented.
The statistical agencies in a number of countries have started to use so-called hedonic price deflators which capture more appropriately the quality-improvements of goods. While computers (in industry ISIC 382/5) are the leading example, the specific deflator treatment can, through inter-industry links, affect measured productivity in all industries. Moreover, the effects are certainly large enough to matter even for aggregate productivity, and consequently, the issue has received much attention recently in the business press. 6 It turns out that in my sample, hedonic price indices are underlying the data only in the case of Canada for the years after 1983. Therefore, to investigate robustness, I will also present results with a limited sample that excludes these years.
This paper analyzes productivity dynamics at the industry level, which is important because there is a considerable amount of heterogeneity across industries. In 1970, it is frequently the case that a country is among the top three in terms of productivity for one industry, but among the bottom three for another industry. Figure 2 shows the average variation in within country productivity levels across industries over time (dashed line). Between 1970 and 1995, there was a slight overall trend towards convergence in these countries.
What about average productivity across countries? As noted above, one expects convergence if countries can draw uniformly from a common pool of technologies. In contrast, diverging productivity levels suggest that there exists an imperfectly usable pool of technologies. First, comparing the nine countries as a group relative to the technological leader during this period, the United States, there is evidence that the nine countries have caught up in terms of productivity, especially between 1970 and 1990. Second, there has been cross-country convergence of productivity among the nine countries between 1970-95. This is indicated by the trend of the solid line in Figure 2 . By industry, for 10 out of 12 industries, or 83 percent, the standard deviation of productivity levels across countries has fallen between 1970 and 1995 (the exceptions are in the chemicals sector: chemicals and drugs, as well as rubber and plastics).
At the same time, the process of catch-up with the technological leader has not been uniform. Figure 2 indicates that the convergence trend among the nine countries has been stronger until about 1983, after which there might be even a slight trend of divergence. Specifically, in 1970, the productivity leader in the sample was Canada, followed by Australia and the Netherlands, while at the bottom of the ranking was Spain. By 1995, the Netherlands has moved to the top of the ranking, followed by Italy and Sweden, whereas the country with the lowest average TFP level was Denmark. Italy posted the strongest gains over these two and a half decades, moving from rank 6 to rank 2, while
Australia is the country that lost most ground, dropping from rank 2 in 1970 to rank 8 by 1995. The change in Australia's ranking is consistent with the idea that it has fallen back due to technology that is geographically localized in the vicinity of the G-5 countries. However, less-remotely located Denmark has also fallen back over this period, suggesting that other factors are important in explaining productivity growth as well. To investigate this further, I will now turn to the empirical specification.
Empirical model and estimation issues
There are various reasons of why international technology diffusion might be related to geographic distance. My empirical analysis does not distinguish them, and hence does not support or reject a particular theory. For concreteness, though, I have laid out in Appendix A a two-country model of growth and trade with transport costs that motivates the following empirical analysis. The model implies that total factor productivity F, defined as value added divided by factor-share weighted capital-and labor inputs, is given at any given point in time by
where the parameter α, 0 < α < 1, is the cost share of labor, andÃ is a country-specific constant. The term N (N * ) is the existing range of domestic (foreign) intermediate products, which is proportional to cumulative R&D and an index of the countries' level of technological knowledge; the term ξ * (D)
is decreasing in the bilateral geographic distance (denoted D) between the domestic and the foreign economy. I will focus on estimating versions of equation (2), which contains the key predictions of interest: productivity is positively related to domestic as well as foreign R&D, and the effectiveness of foreign R&D is negatively related to the distance to the foreign economy.
One specification, employing an exponential functional form, is as follows:
Here, S denotes cumulative R&D spending, g is an index for the group of G-5 countries, and D cg is the bilateral geographic distance between country c-the technology recipient country-and country g-the technology sender. The α ci , α t , β, γ, and δ are parameters to be estimated, and ε cit is an error term whose properties I discuss below. The parameters α ci captures differences inÃ across industries, while the term e −δD cg captures the distance term ξ * (D) in equation (2) above. The parameter β is related to the elasticity of productivity with respect to domestic R&D, while γ determines the strength of the foreign R&D effect on productivity.
The parameter δ is of central interest in this paper, as it captures the degree of localization of R&D;
I will refer to it as the distance parameter. It is identified from variation of the productivity effects of G-5 country R&D in other countries conditional on bilateral distance. Denote S git e −δDcg as effective foreign R&D from country g. Positive estimates of δ mean that variation in productivity levels can be better explained by assuming that effective R&D from countries located relatively far away is smaller than that of other countries located relatively more closely. If foreign R&D raises productivity (γ positive), then positive estimates of δ suggest that the benefits from foreign technology creation are decreasing with distance. This is the sense in which I will investigate whether international technology diffusion is geographically localized. By contrast, estimating δ = 0 would mean that distance does not matter, and δ < 0 would be consistent with the strength of technology diffusion being directly related to distance.
I also present results for a simpler alternative specification:
For this model, three classes of bilateral relationships are formed: between adjacent countries, between countries that occupy the same continent but are not adjacent, and between countries in different continents. Each bilateral relation is in one of these three classes, and I A , I S , and I I are the respective indicator functions. 7 To reduce the number of parameters, the effect from G-5 country R&D in the same continent but not adjacent is constrained to a set value,γ. The key parameter of interest is χ, which measures the symmetric incremental effect for adjacent countries and for inter-continental relationships. The estimation problem is thus simplified to fitting one non-linear parameter in a model where distance is a discrete variable. Estimates ofχ > 0 are consistent with the localization of international technology diffusion. Equations (3) and (4) will be extended to address how important language skills are for technology diffusion, and how the degree of localization of technology diffusion, if it exists, has changed over time.
Two major estimation issues need to be confronted. With only 9×5 bilateral distance relationships, and, moreover, with seven countries located in Europe, there is little variation of bilateral distance in my sample. Choosing a unit of analysis below the country-level would lead to more variation in bilateral distance, but there are two reasons why the analysis of technology diffusion between countries appears to be the appropriate first step in this research agenda: first, whether technology diffuses between two economies is likely due to a significant degree to factors that typically operate at the country-level, such as language, institutions, history, and culture. 8 Second, economic policies, especially towards R&D and technological capacity, are typically adopted at the national level. These two reasons make the country level the natural unit of analysis for the purposes of this paper.
Another concern is that the error term ε cit is not orthogonal to the regressors, because this would lead to inconsistent estimates. 9 The disturbances capture idiosyncratic factors that affect measured productivity. Some could be industry-specific, such as receiving strong inter-industry spillovers, and others might be common to all industries in a given country, such as shocks affecting the national business cycle. Generally, this calls for instrumental-variable estimation; however, good instruments for the R&D variables are unavailable. Instead, I will rely on specification choices in order to minimize the effects of simultaneity. First, a considerable amount of structure has been imposed in constructing the TFP indices, which should help reducing simultaneity problems (see Appendix B). Second, simultaneity induced by using common deflators will not be a major problem, because the R&D figures are based on economy-wide deflators while the TFP indices are based on industry-specific deflators.
Third, I focus on the productivity effects of G-5 R&D in other industrialized countries. This relationship is not as likely to be subject to common shocks as the relation of R&D and productivity in the same country. Further, by including domestic R&D expenditures in the equation I control for an important determinant of productivity that could induce simultaneity (Wesley Cohen and Daniel Levinthal 1989). Fourth, the estimation equations include time fixed effects which control for shocks that affect the entire sample in a given year. I will also provide separate estimates from the sample of low-R&D industries. Unlike transportation, chemicals, and machinery-the industries that account for most of the R&D (see Table 1 )-, the R&D expenditures of the eight low-R&D industries are too small to significantly affect the economy-wide innovative activity. Therefore, simultaneity problems-if present in the full sample-will be greatly reduced in this case. The extent to which the estimates confirm those obtained from the full sample will shed light on whether simultaneity is likely to be a problem.
Lastly, country-by-industry fixed effects control for time-invariant factors that generate a spurious correlation between the error terms and the regressors. In particular, the fixed effects eliminate distance-related productivity differences between industries that are not caused by geographic factors in international technology diffusion, but, for example, by differences in the product mix across countries that are correlated with geography. Thus, the country-by-industry fixed effects are important to avoid spurious correlation and, consequently, inconsistent estimates in the following analysis.
Estimation Results
The dependent variable is the relative productivity level as defined by equation (1) . The regressors are fixed effects for each year and for each country-by-industry combination, the domestic R&D stock, and the R&D stocks of the G-5 countries interacted with the bilateral geographic distance as described above. The estimation method is non-linear least squares. For the following analysis, I normalize distance so that D = 1 is equal to 235 kilometers, the smallest bilateral distance in my sample (between Germany and the Netherlands). This choice of units affects the size of the coefficients, but not that of the estimated elasticities and other statistics reported below.
Benchmark results
The benchmark estimates are presented in Table 2 , together with their standard errors, shown in parentheses (fixed effects estimates α ci and α t are available upon request). 10 The first specification is identical to equation (3), with distance entering exponentially and a common G-5 R&D effect. The productivity effect from domestic R&D is estimated as β = 0.078, with a standard error of 0.013.
This is comparable to estimates from related studies (see Griliches 1995) . The parameter estimate of γ = 0.843 determines the relative potency of distance-deflated foreign R&D.
The parameter estimate of δ is equal to 1.005. This suggests that effective R&D from G-5 countries is falling with bilateral distance. The finding is consistent with the localization hypothesis: productivity in countries that are far away from the G-5 countries is lower than in those located more closely, because technology diffusion and its productivity effects are geographically localized. In specification (2.2), I allow for technology sender effects that vary by G-5 country, γ g . Japan's sender effect γ J has been set to one because it is only weakly identified. There is some evidence that the sender effects of the U.S. and of Germany are larger, while that of the U.K. is smaller than the average G-5 effect.
However, the more general model is not strongly preferred in terms of standard model selection criteria such as the R 2 and Akaike's Information Criterion (AIC), 11 and the estimated β and δ vary little from those in column 1. In specification (2.3), the γ g are all constrained to equal one; this leads to similar results.
1 0 I rely primarily on bootstrapped standard errors for inference. They seem to be more reliable and, in any case, they are often much larger than standard errors based on first-order asymptotics. The bootstrapped standard errors are heteroskedasticity-consistent (through block-wise resampling for each country-by-industry combination) and relatively robust to serial correlation (through resampling two consecutive errors at a time); see Donald Andrews (1999) for references and further results. I report conventional asymptotic standard errors when they are clearly larger than the bootstrapped ones; this is occasionally the case, especially for the parameter γ. I have also considered the possibility of spatial correlation among the disturbances. However, the correlation of fitted residuals among European countries, e.g., is not significantly different from the correlation of errors between European and non-European countries. This suggests that spatial correlation effects are not very strong. 1 1 The latter is defined as AIC = ln( e 0 e n )+2k/n, where e 0 e is the residual sum of squares, n the number of observations, and k the number of estimated parameters; a lower AIC value is preferred.
In the last column of Table 2, I show the results for the distance class specification. 12 The parameter χ is estimated to equal 0.090, with a standard error of 0.012. This is also consistent with international technology diffusion being geographically localized, because it indicates that the effect from adjacent G-5 country R&D is stronger than that from non-adjacent G-5 countries, which itself is stronger than the effect of G-5 R&D spending in other continents. The distance class specification leads to a worse empirical fit compared to the exponential specification, but the difference is small.
How strong are the localization effects that these estimates suggest? For specification (2.1), the elasticity of productivity with respect to foreign R&D stock is on average about 0.5 percent, whereas the elasticity with respect to distance is on average −1.5 percent. However, these elasticities are different for each individual observation and vary substantially, which complicates their interpretation.
In the exponential specification, one can compute the geographic half-life of technology. This is the distance D * at which only half of the technology that was sent out is still available. It is computed from Another interesting statistic is the productivity-enhancing value of one dollar of foreign R&D per dollar of domestic R&D, which is equal to γ exp(−δD). For specification (2.1), this ranges between 31 percent (German R&D in the Netherlands) to 0 percent in many cases. The relative value of U.S. R&D in Canada is 4 percent. Clearly, the degree of localization suggested by these estimates is very strong, and perhaps too strong to be plausible. In the distance class analysis, the estimate of χ = 0.09 implies that the average foreign effect from adjacent (intercontinental) G-5 country R&D is 37 percent higher (lower) than from non-adjacent G-5 countries in the same continent. While these estimates are considerably smaller than those obtained from the exponential specification, they still suggest that distance is an important conditioning factor for international technology diffusion. 1 2 The foreign R&D term is estimated asγ 1
, so that, in equation (4),γ =γ 1 (1 −γ 2 ) andχ =γ 1 χ. The value ofγ 1 andγ 2 are set at 0.2 and 0.8, respectively, which is close to what one obtains by estimating these parameters (at the expense of robustness). In the estimation, a change inγ 1 leads to a corresponding change in the estimated χ but does not affectχ and the major findings discussed below.
Sensitivity analysis
The analysis in Table 3 investigates the robustness of these findings. I use the exponential functional form for the results presented in columns one to three, while the distance class specification is employed for the remaining columns four to six. In the first specification only the eight low-R&D industries are included. I estimate β at 0.063, down from 0.078 in the full sample. 13 The distance parameter δ is now also slightly lower, but overall, the results do not change in a major way. The second column presents estimates when TFP indices are based on gross output-instead of value added data, which is an alternative approximation to true productivity. The distance parameter is estimated much lower than before (δ = 0.547). Assuming the lower knowledge depreciation rate of 0 percent instead of 10 percent leads primarily to a higher domestic R&D effect (see (3.3) ). 14 When factor input data is not adjusted for differences in input utilization, the estimate of the domestic R&D effect β is more than 30 percent higher than in the corresponding specification with adjusted TFP data (see (3.4) ). This suggests that one picks up a substantial amount of spurious correlation when cyclical effects that affect both input utilization and R&D are not controlled. In contrast, the estimate of χ is relatively close to the earlier estimate. For the lagged R&D specification, I correlate TFP at time t with cumulative R&D at time t − 2. In that case, the R&D stocks are pre-determined. If these results would be very different, it could mean that simultaneity continues to play an important role. The similarity of the results suggests, however, that this is not the case. The last column of Table 3 presents the results for the sample years 1970-83; 1983 is the last year for which the OECD data for Canada are based on non-hedonic price deflators. I estimate a higher value of χ than for the full sample, implying a higher 1 3 Because the industry R&D elasticity εi is related to the return to R&D, ρ i by εi = ρ i S i F i , ∀ i, if arbitrage equalizes the return to R&D across industries (ρ i = ρ, ∀ i), then εi varies with Si. This could explain the drop of the coefficient β (which is positively related to ε i ) when the sample contains the relatively low-R&D industries only. 1 4 An R&D depreciation rate of 0 percent is sometimes assumed to be the 'true' social rate of knowledge depreciation. Ceteris paribus, a lower rate of R&D depreciation implies faster growth of the R&D stocks, which, for a given return to R&D, implies a higher R&D elasticity. Thus, the higher estimate of β is consistent with that. degree of localization. At the same time, the result suggests that the qualitative finding of localization is not related to the differential deflator treatment in the sample. 15 In unreported analysis, I have used other combinations of data samples and specifications from Table 2 , as well as a number of other specifications. Overall, it appears that there is a significant geographic localization effect in international technology diffusion. 16 In the exponential specification, the parameter β is about 0.06 to 0.11, varying in a reasonable way across different samples and data constructions. There is some evidence that the relative foreign R&D effects γ g differ across G-5 countries. However, the γ parameter adds relatively little in terms of regression fit and appears to be at times only weakly identified. In the distance class specification, the parameter β is of similar magnitude, though somewhat less precisely estimated. Here, γ is constrained instead of freely estimated, but the qualitative finding on localization is the same. While this qualitative finding seems to be robust, its magnitude is not. For the exponential functional form, the estimates of δ range from about 0.5 to 1.2, and at least the higher end of this range, imply localization effects that are too strong to be plausible. The magnitude of the localization effect that is estimated from the distance class analysis is considerably smaller.
Some evidence on the importance of language for spillovers
It is a priori plausible to hypothesize that language is an important determinant of spillover strength.
The following extensions to the specifications of Table 2 incorporate language variables. In the first of these, the relative effect from foreign R&D is allowed to be different among technology sender and 1 5 I have also experimented with excluding Canada from the sample and using data for all years. This confirms the localization result, but because Canada is important in identifying the spatial effect from U.S. R&D, the parameters are less precisely estimated. 1 6 Based on the bootstrap analysis, in all specifications except for (3.4) and (3.5), the null hypothesis of no localization can be rejected at a 1 percent significance level. For those two specifications, the null can be rejected at a 5 percent level. recipient countries if they share the same language:
where I sl cg is equal to one if countries c and g share the same language, and zero otherwise. 17 The results in the first column of Table 4 are consistent with the hypothesis that speaking the same language strongly facilitates the diffusion of technology (η = 0.565). One question is to what extent this really represents a same-language effect, or rather just stronger technology diffusion among these four bilateral relations-especially between the U.S. and Canada. Therefore, I allow the U.S.-Canada effect to differ from the general same-language effect in (4.2): ς measures the incremental U.S.-Canada effect in addition to the same-language effect η. As expected, conditional on distance, technology diffusion between the U.S. and Canada is-significantly, at standard levels-stronger than among other same-language pairs, but η nevertheless remains positive and large.
In the distance class specification (4.3), the parameter η is estimated to be also positive, at 0.605.
A major difference relative to the exponential specification, however, is that introducing the samelanguage variable here eliminates the localization effect. One possible explanation is that the samelanguage variable takes away a substantial amount of variation from the analysis of technology diffusion across distance classes-three same-language relationships are intercontinental, and the fourth is adjacent-, so that there is not enough variation left to identify a strong localization effect.
I have also compiled more comprehensive language data: the share of the population in the technology recipient country that speaks the language of the technology sender countries (English, Japanese, German, and French). These data have a number of limitations that the reader should keep in mind in what follows. 18 The language shares are employed in analogy to the same-language variable in equation (5) to estimate the parameter λ. The fourth column in Table 4 When the language share variable is included analogously into the distance class specification, λ is also estimated to be positive. In contrast to the exponential specification, though, the language share variable now weakens considerably the localization effect: χ falls from 0.09 in the benchmark specification (2.4) down to 0.06, albeit still significantly above zero at a 5 percent level. This parallels the findings using the same-language variable: similarity of language skills seems to account for the better part of the variation in the differential strength of bilateral technology diffusion, and not variation in distance. Overall, this analysis suggests that language skills are important for international technology diffusion, both because the language variables always enter with a positive sign, and because they reduce or eliminate the localization effect for the distance class specification. At the same time, the improvement in regression fit tends to be small. Clearly these findings are preliminary, and more work needs to be done on this issue. 1 8 First, language knowledge in the population at large might be of limited relevance for knowledge diffusion at the twoto three-digit manufacturing industry level, because the language of communication among R&D engineers in Germany and Italy, e.g., could be neither German nor Italian, but English. This point applies to the same-language variable above as well. There is evidence suggesting that language skills in the population at large are positively correlated with those of the relevant employees at manufacturing firms (see the case study of the cell phone producer Nokia and other related evidence in Anne West et al. 2000) . Second, even the available data on language skills is sketchy and not fully comparable; the best available set of estimates is for the late 1990's, after the last year of my period of observation. The flip side of the above argument suggests, however, that endogeneity is unlikely to be a major factor. For more discussion in general, see West et al. (2000) . In this section I analyze whether the technology localization effect has become stronger or weaker over time (see Table 5 ). The exponential specification is extended to
where I t is equal to zero for the years 1970-82 and equal to one for 1983-95. A negative value of ψ D indicates that technology flows from the G-5 countries have a less geographically localized productivity effect over time. I also allow for a change in the relative effect from distance-adjusted foreign R&D (with parameter ψ F ), which documents whether the degree of localization has changed independent of the general foreign effect. The parameter ψ D is estimated to be −0.784, while ψ F is positive, but not significantly different from zero. This suggests that the degree of localization has substantially fallen from the 1970's to the early 1990's.
The localization parameter δ is now estimated at 0.384, which is much lower than in the corresponding specification of Table 2 The evidence on how international technology diffusion has changed over time appears to be mixed.
A weakening is estimated when bilateral relations are categorized by distance class, while using more detailed information on bilateral distance suggests that foreign sources have become stronger over time, because a lower estimate of δ during the later period means that the relative value of one dollar of foreign R&D has gone up over time. By contrast, all estimates suggest that over these 25 years, there has been a strong shift in the composition of sources of foreign technology, away from geographically nearby-and towards remote countries. Overall, the exponential specification now appears to be preferred, given that the distance parameter is robust across different samples and the estimated degree of localization is in an a priori plausible range. Thus, the results point to both less localized and more international technology diffusion over time.
Can these results explain the productivity dynamics of these countries? To investigate this, I report in Table 6 three different measures of spillover strength, based on the results of specification (5.1). The first two columns show the mean value of one dollar of R&D spent in each G-5 country in units of "equivalent" domestic R&D (that is, the mean of
, for each country c). The second two columns give information on the average absolute total spillover received by each country (given by Υ c ≡
. This incorporates information on cross-country differences in proximity to the larger R&D source countries. The last two columns report the share of this total spillover in the sum of total spillover plus domestic R&D (that is, the mean of
Columns one and two show that the average value of a dollar of G-5 R&D has more than tripled in these nine countries between 1970/82 and 1983/95, from about 10 percent (0.518 divided by five G-5 countries) to more than 35 percent (correspondingly, 1.815 divided by five). Columns three and four also suggest that remotely located countries such as Australia have benefited relatively the most from the decline in the localization effect. In Australia, the average total spillover went up by a factor of about 20,000, while in the Netherlands, for instance, it went up by only a factor of 4.2 from the 1970's to the early 1990's. 20 However, the dynamics of the productivity ranking depends on the countries' absolute productivity levels, and these levels are influenced by the absolute levels of G-5 technology inflows. The Netherlands had far higher totals than Australia in both periods, and while the former has benefited less from its relatively central location in 1983/95 than it did before, even in the later period the Netherlands' total spillover from the G-5 country R&D is about one hundred times that of Australia according to these estimates. Thus, these results are consistent both with the Netherlands moving up and with Australia falling from rank 2 almost all the way to the bottom of the productivity ranking by 1995. Canada received the highest total spillover in both subperiod according to these estimates (see columns three and four of Table 6 ), even though Sweden and Italy have overtaken Canada by the end of the sample period in terms of average productivity.
Moreover, also the example of Denmark suggests that the effects of localized technology diffusion are far from accounting for all of the productivity dynamics: Denmark's disappointing performance between 1970 and 1995 is not what one would have predicted given the country's relatively central location relative to the G-5 countries. 21 The last two columns in Table 6 indicate that G-5 country spillovers are very important, and that over time, the importance of foreign R&D has further increased relative to domestic R&D in accounting for productivity differences across these nine countries: while the spillover share in total effective R&D was on average about three quarters in the 1970s, its share grew to almost 90 percent during the later subperiod (see the means of 0.764 and 0.893 in the last but one line). Finally, it is interesting to note that according to all three spillover measures, their normalized standard deviation across the nine countries has fallen substantially from the 1970's to the early 1990's (last line in Table 6 ). This is consistent with the notion that differences across countries in their access to foreign technology have declined over these twenty-five years.
Summary and discussion
I have analyzed the international diffusion of technology by estimating the spatial distribution of productivity effects of G-5 country R&D spending in other OECD countries. The evidence suggests that this diffusion is geographically localized, in the sense that the productivity effects of R&D decline 2 1 A partial explanation of the relatively small effect of foreign R&D on Canadian productivity might be as follows: Most of Canada's spillover effect is derived from R&D conducted in the U.S., and the importance of that might have fallen over the sample period because U.S. technology is increasingly generated in subsidiaries of U.S.-owned multinational enterprises that are located in Canada (due to its geographic focus, the OECD statistics count such R&D as Canadian R&D, not as U.S. R&D).
with the geographic distance between sender and recipient countries. The estimated magnitude of this effect varies across specifications. The half-life distance of technology ranges from a low of 162 kilometers to an average of about 1,200 kilometers in the preferred specification (5.1). A simpler specification suggests that the effect of adjacent (intercontinental) G-5 country R&D is about 37 percent higher (lower) than from G-5 countries that are in the same continent as the recipient country, but not adjacent to it. For example, the total value of G-5 country R&D in units of "equivalent" domestic R&D in the Netherlands is roughly 40 percent higher than in Australia, according to these estimates.
Second, the localization of technology diffusion has significantly declined over the sample period.
Again, estimates vary somewhat depending on specification. According to the exponential specification, the technology half-life distance has fallen by about two thirds between the periods of 1970-82 and 1983-95, which translates into a decline in the average TFP elasticity with respect to distance of about 20 percent (from −2.4 percent to −2.0 percent in (5.1)). Also, the distance class specification suggests that the localization effect has fallen substantially over time: the Netherlands had a 80 percent higher total effect from G-5 R&D than Australia during 1970/82, while during the later years, the Netherlands' advantage was down to about 15 percent.
The degree of technology localization implied by some of my estimates, especially those based on the exponential functional form, is probably too high. For instance, although it is plausible that U.S.
R&D is Canada's major foreign source of technology, my estimate of the U.S. share (exceeding 99 percent during the years 1970/82, based on the first column in Table 6 ) appears to be too high, as it suggests that Japan, Germany, France and the U.K. together contributed no more than 1 percent to Canada's stock of foreign technology. For the later years of 1983-95, the U.S. share of Canada's total foreign R&D inflows is about two thirds, which is more plausible. The distance class analysis confirms an important, but less dramatic localization effect. I also estimate that the localization effect has been diminishing extremely rapidly, by over 50 percent during a relatively short period of time. This result should be treated with some caution as well until it has been confirmed by other research.
Specifically, as data on a larger set of countries, especially outside Europe, becomes available, it will be possible to re-examine the questions I have addressed. Moreover, it might be possible in the future to compute productivity indices that consistently account for differences in human capital across countries and industries. In terms of specification, I have focused on international withinindustry effects, while technology diffusion between industries-that is, across technology space-might be important as well. Further, the temporal dimension of technology diffusion might matter as well; in my analysis which focuses on contemporaneous effects, this temporal dimension has been collapsed into one point in time. Hanson (1998) estimates the geographic scope of demand linkages by correlating county-level wages with distance-weighted incomes in other U.S. counties. His results also imply a very high degree of localization, in that case for goods trade. 22 This raises the question of whether it is distance-related transport costs for high-technology goods that are behind the geographic localization of technology diffusion, or some other factor. Whereas I estimate that the degree of technology localization has sharply fallen over time, research in international trade using so-called gravity equations frequently shows no evidence for a decline in the elasticity of trade with respect to transport cost (or distance).
However, this finding appears to be due to changes in the composition of goods trade. 23 Thus, the lack of evidence for a strong decline of distance effects in gravity equations-especially at the aggregate level, where composition changes will go unobserved-at the same time when technology diffusion has become less localized cannot be taken as evidence against the hypothesis that localized technology diffusion is in part due to localized trade in high-technology goods.
This paper cannot give a definitive answer on how much of international technology diffusion is related to goods trade versus to other spillover channels. One alternative to trade that is likely to be important is foreign direct investment (FDI) (e.g., Richard Caves 1996). Since not only is bilateral trade negatively correlated with distance, but FDI activity is as well, 24 FDI is an alternative potential explanation of localization. The language results presented above suggest an important element in international technology diffusion that is not necessarily related to goods trade. While in some cases the language variable eliminate the localization finding, generally the results suggest that technology diffusion through disembodied spillovers account only for a part of the localization effect (for about one third in (4.5)). How could language matter? James Rauch (1999) , for example, presents a network and information cost theory of trade, and it is plausible that in such a theory language would matter also for the diffusion of technology across economies.
From this analysis of technological knowledge spillovers to nine OECD countries which are near the world's technology frontier, we see that national technological developments have often ceased to play the most important role for these nations' productivity. There has been a strong trend towards the globalization of technology. At the same time, geographic factors leading to clusters of countries that have access to a regional pool of technology are important today, and are likely to remain important for some time to come.
According to the following model, technology diffusion is related to international trade, which itself is geographically localized. Consider two symmetric countries, home and foreign, that are located at distance D from each other. In the home country, output is produced according to the familiar CES-specification due to Avinash Dixit and Joseph Stiglitz (1977)
where A > 0 is a constant and K is capital. 
wherep andp * is the price for any of the symmetric domestic and foreign intermediates, respectively. 
Thus, when D > 0, the equilibrium usage of foreign intermediates is below that of domestic intermediates. Assuming that the two countries have exogenous endowments of labor of L and L * which have no alternative usage, and using the fact that the countries are symmetric and hence m = m * , it is possible to show that (7) as (11) predicts that home output is falling, all else equal, in the distance to the foreign economy. If total factor productivity is defined as
which is shown in the text. A complete description of this model requires to specify preferences and the process determining N and N * . For the purposes of this paper, this is not necessary, but the interested reader might consult Romer (1990) as well as Philippe Aghion and Peter Howitt (1992) . 25 This is a simple framework. Economic geography, through its effect on trade and technology diffusion, is the only factor determining the spatial correlation of productivity. Other factors, such as language, may also influence technology diffusion, and the empirical analysis takes this to some extent into account. Moreover, even though this model is highly stylized, the broad conclusion that an economy's productivity is related to its geographic location is not unique to this trade-and-growth model: it is also consistent with some recent models in the economic geography literature. 26 The analysis above is thus distinguished by a focus on geographic factors affecting knowledge spillovers, and it allows to see how these factors alone help to explain variation in productivity levels across countries and over time.
B Data on labor inputs, physical capital, and gross production Table 3 ).
Data on labor and physical capital inputs has been used in the construction of the TFP indices.
The number of workers is taken from the STAN database. The figures are adjusted by multiplying them by the average annual hours per manufacturing worker in country c and time t to arrive at the 2 6 E.g., Krugman and Venables (1995) . See Baldwin and Forslid (2000) for a paper that integrates elements of the recent growth-and economic geography literatures. Baldwin and Forslid's analysis suggests that lowering the transport costs for goods tends to favor divergence while lowering the barriers for technology spillovers tends to lead to convergence. labor input measure, denoted L. The data on annual hours worked is from OECD (1999); a relatively small number of missing values has been interpolated. Physical capital stock data is not available in the STAN database, but gross fixed capital formation in current prices is. I first convert the industry investment flows into constant 1990 prices using country-and industry-specific deflators that are derived from the STAN database. The capital stocks are then estimated using the perpetual inventory method. The capital stock measure is also adjusted for cyclical differences in capacity utilization.
Let the parameter α be the share of the labor in total production costs. Following the approach suggested by Hall (1990) , the α's are not constructed as the ratio of total labor compensation to value added (the revenue-based factor shares), but as cost-based factor shares which are more robust in the presence of imperfect competition. Labor and capital inputs together with the factor shares allow to construct an index of relative total inputs ln I cit − lnI cit ,
for all c, i, and t, where ln
TFP index is obtained by subtracting relative total input from relative value added, see equation (1) in the text.
C Data on R&D Expenditures
The R&D expenditure data come from OECD (1998b). I have been able to obtain consistent data for all twelve industries and the period of 1970-95 for fourteen countries. The data cover generally all business enterprise intramural R&D expenditures; the OECD code for this series is BERD. It would be preferable to use only the part of business enterprise R&D that is privately funded, given the evidence showing that publicly funded R&D has a lower return, but is not equally important in all industries.
However, the privately funded business R&D data is not fully available, so that this analysis has to rely on the BERD series.
The R&D expenditures are available in constant 1990 $ U.S., using the OECD purchasing power parity rates for conversion. I use the perpetual inventory method to construct R&D stocks, assuming a rate of depreciation of the knowledge stock of 0.1. A higher (lower) choice of this depreciation rate reduces (increases) the rate of growth of the knowledge stock over the period of observation. Some results presented above are based on alternative R&D stocks that assume a zero rate of depreciation for R&D capital. Table 6 Various measures of spillover strength over time
Based on specification 5.1 in Table 5 Total value of $ 1 R&D Total spillover received ** Total spillover as share in spent in each G-5 country* domestic R&D plus total spillover 
